


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8 November 1962 25X1




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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


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2. USSR: Khrushchev's remarks at 7 November reception. (*Page ii*)
3. Cuba: Remarks of Soviet Ambassador at Havana reception. (*Page iv*)
4. USSR: Large naval ballistic missile noted for first time in Moscow parade. (*Page v*)



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**\*USSR:** Khrushchev's remarks at a 7 November Kremlin reception provide further evidence that the Soviet leaders contemplate a period of relative inaction and consolidation while they assess the effects of the Cuban crisis on the USSR's world position and study the future course of US policy.

Moscow appears to feel that the outcome of the Cuban affair has reduced Soviet bargaining power and that there would be no prospect of gaining Western concessions in new negotiations on such issues as Berlin and Germany in the near future.

Khrushchev implied that he has abandoned his earlier plan to come to the US to attend the UN General Assembly and to meet with President Kennedy. He said such a meeting is not necessary at this time and that he would favor heads-of-government talks only "if it is question of peace and war."

The Soviet premier failed to use this opportunity to renew pressure for a Berlin settlement. He ridiculed Western press speculation regarding a Soviet "timetable" for a separate peace treaty with East Germany and said only that "we need a treaty" and that the Berlin question "must be solved."

Khrushchev displayed considerable sensitivity to Western views that he had backed down in the Cuban crisis and that the West should now adopt a tougher stance in dealing with the USSR. He defended the necessity of "flexibility" in foreign policy and

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suggested that it was futile to ask "who won and who lost." He also attempted to minimize the significance of "40 rockets" in Cuba, saying that "even 140 wouldn't be enough."

Khrushchev acknowledged that Castro has opposed his decision to remove the missiles. He claimed that Moscow had assured the Cubans that it would not abandon them but, at the same time, had warned them that if Khrushchev did not agree to a settlement, "it would mean war."

His remarks also suggest that he may be anticipating a situation in which the US, after the rapid removal of missiles from Cuba without UN inspection and verification, may decline to implement President Kennedy's offer of assurances against an invasion. He said that the Soviet leaders, unlike the Cubans, believed that the President would "keep his word." He warned, however, that if a formal US guarantee is not forthcoming, this would "put us back to a position of catastrophe."

Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union would end its current nuclear test series on 20 November.

In reply to a question, Khrushchev said "it is a good time" for a nuclear test ban agreement and claimed that the Soviet and US positions are "very close together." He immediately qualified this optimism, however, by saying that US tests "will start up again" and by indicating that Soviet scientists would continue preparations for "future experiments."

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\*Cuba: At Havana's celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, major speeches were delivered by Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, president of the agrarian reform institute and seventh ranking leader of the Cuban political machine. Mikoyan was on the speakers' platform with President Dorticos, but Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara were apparently absent.

The Soviet ambassador's speech was replete with references to Fidel Castro as "Cuba's legendary national hero" and the Cuban people's "supreme leader." He appeared to go out of his way to stress that Cuban-Soviet friendship is based on "mutual respect" and "complete equality." In this speech, which must have received prior approval from Mikoyan, the Soviet ambassador added that his government supports "the legitimate demands of the revolutionary government of Cuba which are aimed at guaranteeing the sovereignty and security of the country, formulated by Comrade Fidel in his five-point communiqué."

The general tenor of the Soviet ambassador's speech suggests a concerted effort to mollify the Cuban leaders, whereas the absence of the three highest ranking Cubans could have been a protest against Soviet pressures. [REDACTED]

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\*USSR: The USSR exhibited a large naval ballistic-missile for the first time in the October Revolution parade in Moscow on 7 November.

According to Izvestia this weapon "can be fired from any position both above and below the water."

A tentative analysis [ ] indicate that the missile is 50-60 feet long and consists of three sections of different diameters. The aftermost and largest section has a diameter of about six feet which comprises about half the length of the missile.

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This overall length would prohibit the use of the missile in any known Soviet submarine unless a stage were removed. The size also implies a range considerably greater than that of any known missile now operational in the Soviet Navy.

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### NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(The United States Intelligence Board on 7 November 1962, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

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(NIE 62-2-62: "The Short-Term Outlook in Algeria")

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(Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of USIB approval and the printed text within five days)

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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